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v.

:

STANLEY MALSTROM,

:

Case No. 900057-CA

Priority Two

Defendant/Appellant. :
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of practicing medicine
without a license, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988).

Defendant was convicted

following a bench trial in Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant, who voluntarily chose to

represent himself at trial, is entitled to be held to a lesser
standard of competency than would otherwise be required.

There

has been no clearly articulated standard of review by Utah
courts.

As a general rule, a party who represents himself will

be held to the same standard as a member of the bar*

Nelson v.

Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).
2.

Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish

defendant's conviction for practicing medicine without a license.
The standard of review to be applied following a bench trial is
whether the trial court's determination of guilt was clearly
erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence, or
whether this Court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1987).
3.

Whether the state was required to affirmatively

prove that none of the exemptions in the Medical Practice Act's
prohibition against practicing medicine without a license applied
to defendant, or, alternatively, whether the trial court erred in
determining that none of the exceptions was applicable to
defendant under the facts of this case.

See State v. Cox, 751

P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Reams v. State, 279 So.2d
839, 843 (Fla. 1973).
4.

Whether defendant can argue that the statute which

prohibits practicing medicine without a license, Utah Code Ann. §
58-12-30 (Supp. 1988) is unconstitutionally overbroad.

State v.

Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987).
5.

Whether defendant preserved for appeal the trial

court's decision to admit evidence concerning Mrs. Marshall's
pain and subsequent surgery after having received treatment by
defendant, or, alternatively, whether the admission of the
evidence was in fact error.

In reviewing this issue, this court
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must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Zions Corp. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled
on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984) .
6.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to grant defendant's post-trial motion for new trial in
this case.

The standard of review is whether the trial court

clearly abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant.
State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATES AND RULES
In addition to the provisions quoted throughout this
brief, the following provisions are provided:
Dtah Code Ann. S 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988):
It is unlawful to engage in the practice
of medicine in this state without first
obtaining a license. Any person who engages
in the practice of medicine without a license
is guilty of a felony; except the following
persons may engage in activities included in
the practice of medicine subject to the
circumstances and limitations stated:
(1) a medical officer of the armed forces
, of the United States, of the United States
Public Health Service, or of the Veterans
Administration, while engaged in the
performance of his official duties;
(2) an individual residing in another
state or country and authorized to practice
medicine there, who is called in consultation
by an individual licensed in this state or
who, for the purpose of furthering education
in the healing arts, is invited by a
professional school approved by the division
or by a state professional association of
medical practitioners or by one of their
component societies, to conduct a lecture,
clinic, or demonstration, while engaged in
activities in connection with the
consultation, lecture, clinic, or
demonstration, so long as he does not open an
office or appoint a place to meet patients or
receive calls within this state;
-3-

(3) an individual authorized to practice
medicine in another state or country or a
medical officer described in Subsection (1)#
or an individual who has received the degree
of doctor of medicine, while rendering
medical care in a time of disaster or while
caring for an ill or injured individual at
the scene of an emergency and while
continuing to care for the individual;
(4) any individual rendering aid in an
emergency, when no fee or other consideration
of value for the service is contemplated,
charged or received;
(5) any individual administering a
domestic or family remedy including those
persons engaged in the sale of vitamins,
health food or health food supplements, herb
or other produces of nature, except drugs or
medicines for which an authorized
prescription is required by law;
(6) a person engaged in good faith in the
practice of the religious tenets of any
church or religious belief without the use of
any drugs or medicines for which an
authorized prescription is required by law;
(7) a person licensed under other laws of
this state to practice dentistry or dental
surgery, optometry, osteopathy, pharmacy,
podiatry, chiropractic, naturopathy, physical
therapy, nursing, psychology, or other
licensed profession to the extent authorized
by his license;
(8) a student in training in a
professional school approved by the division
while performing the duties of an intern or
similar function in a hospital under the
supervision of its staff;
(9) an individual appointed as an intern
or accepted for specialty or residency
training in a hospital approved by the
division to the extent required by the duties
of his position or by his program of training
for a period of two years and for any
additional periods the division, upon
application, deems necessary and proper;
(10) an individual who, after December 31,
1951, was licensed by another state or
country to practice medicine in that state or
country or who received the degree of doctor
of medicine from a medical college in good
standing in the United States, the District
of Columbia, or Canada or from a foreign
medical college recognized by the educational
commission for foreign medical graduates, and
-4-

has passed an examination given by the
commission, and who is regularly employed by
the University of Utah Medical School upon
its full-time teaching staff, and for
purposes of teaching only and while engaged
in the performance of his duties so long as
he does not open an office or appoint a place
to meet private patients or receive calls
within this state;
(11) an individual authorized by the
Department of Health under Section 26-1-30
for the purpose of withdrawing blood to
determine the alcoholic content pursuant to
Section 41-6-44.10.
Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-28(2) & (4) (Supp. 1988):
(2) "Diagnose" means to examine in any
manner another person, parts of a person's
body, substance, fluids, or materials
excreted, taken or removed from a person's
body, or produced by a person's body, to
determine the source, nature, kind, or extent
of a disease or other physical or mental
condition, or to attempt to so examine or to
determine, or to hold oneself out or
represent that an examination or
determination is being made or to make an
examination or determination upon or from
information supplied directly or indirectly
by another person, whether or not in the
presence of the person making or attempting
the diagnosis.
. . . .

(4) "Practice of medicine" means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or
prescribe for any human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other
condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary, or to attempt to do so by any
means or instrumentality;
(b) to maintain an office or place of
business for the purpose of doing any of the
acts described in Subsection (4)(a) whether
or not for compensation;
(c) to use, in the conduct of any
occupation or profession pertaining to the
diagnosis or treatment of human diseases or
conditions in any printed material,
stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs,
advertisements, the designation "doctor,"
"doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon,"
"physician and surgeon," "Dr.," "M.D.," or
any combination of these designations, unless
-5-

the designation additionally contains the
description of the branch of the healing arts
for which the person has a license.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 31, 1989, defendant, Stanley Malstrom, was
found guilty of practicing medicine without a license, a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp.
1988).

On motion of defendant, the jury was waived and the case

tried to the bench in Third District Court, Judge Timothy R.
Hanson presiding.

On October 24, 1989, defendant's motion for

new trial was heard by the court; defendant was represented by
counsel.

The trial court denied the motion.

Defendant was

sentenced to up to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined
$5,000; the sentence was stayed and he was placed on probation
for eighteen months with all but $3,000 of the fine suspended.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on November 22, 1989.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 29, 1988, defendant, Stanley Malstrom
examined and treated Carol Marshall of Spanish Fork, Utah, for
unspecified "digestive problems" (T. 11).

Defendant was not

licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah (T. 9).
The examination and treatment took place at defendant's
Midvale, Utah, home at approximately 7:30 p.m. (T. 11). Mrs.
Marshall was accompanied to defendant's home by her husband, Rex
Marshall, and two friends, Deryl and Bernice Tischner (T. 11).
The trial transcript is entered in the record at page 86 and the
sentencing transcript at page 87. Hereinafter cites to the trial
transcript are labeled (T.
) and cites to the sentencing
transcript are labeled (ST.
). All other cites to the record
are labeled (R.
).
-6-

Mr. and Mrs. Tischner had recommended defendant and had
arranged the appointment for Mrs. Marshall (T. 14). Defendant
had agreed to see Mrs. Marshall on an evening during his vacation
because that was the only time she and her husband could travel
to Midvale for an appointment (T. 32). Mr. and Mrs. Tischner had
previously sent numerous other patients to defendant, including
members of their own family (T. 33).
Defendant led Mr. and Mrs. Marshall and Mr. and Mrs.
Tischner into an "examining room" in his home (T. 12-13).
Defendant instructed Mrs. Marshall to lay down on top of an
"oblong-shaped table with padding on top" which appeared to be an
examining table (T. 13, 43). Although defendant never
represented himself to her as a medical doctor, Mrs. Marshall was
under the impression that he was a doctor of internal medicine
(T. 21-22), and she had gone to see defendant for "digestive
problems" (T. 14). Mr. Marshall specifically told defendant that
Mrs. Marshall had digestive problems and had undergone surgery
for a hiatal hernia (T. 44). Defendant responded that he wished
she had come to him first so she could have avoided the surgery
(T. 44).
Defendant proceeded to examine Mrs. Marshall, probing
her stomach, her sternum, and her throat with his hands (T. 14,
44).

Defendant then instructed Mrs. Marshall to sit upright on

the table.

He took hold of her esophagus, which he called her

"rattling chain," and shook it (T. 15). Upon completion of his
examination, defendant concluded that Mrs. Marshall had Ma messed
up pancreas" (T. 15, 22).
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Defendant then had Mrs. Marshall roll over onto her
stomach.

As she rolled over, he took hold of her head and

twisted her neck with a quick movement which caused her neck to
produce a popping sound (T. 15, 45). The twisting motion caused
Mrs. Marshall to feel severe pain in the back of her neck and
down through her shoulders (T. 15). She feared that two of her
vertebrae, which had been fused together in a surgical procedure
several years prior, might have been separated (T. 15).
After twisting Mrs. Marshall's neck, defendant then
applied pressure on each of her hip joints (T. 16). When
defendant finished and asked how she felt, Mrs. Marshall replied
that she was in pain (T. 17). Defendant then applied pressure
with his fingers to various points inside Mrs. Marshall's mouth
to alleviate the pain, but each time he removed the pressure, the
pain returned (T. 17). Because the pain was still present after
pushing at points inside her mouth, defendant informed Mrs.
Marshall that she probably had a sinus infection and should see
her doctor (T. 18). Defendant then performed some spinal
manipulation on Mrs. Marshall by pushing down on both sides of
her spine, causing it to produce popping sounds (T. 18).
After he finished manipulating Mrs. Marshall's spine,
defendant then prescribed some dietary alterations, advising Mrs.
Marshall to avoid certain types of foods (T. 18). He also
instructed her to periodically take a "green drink," which was
made of various vegetables, pineapple juice and cayenne pepper
(T. 18). Finally, he instructed Mrs. Marshall to use a garlic
enema (T. 23).

-8-

About a week following the treatment, Mrs. Marshall saw
a physical therapist who noted that she had marked pain and
muscle spasms (T. 25-26).

She also had swelling in her neck and

shoulders and pain and numbness in her arms.

Mrs. Marshall

subsequently underwent surgery for a herniated disc at the C5-6
level of her vertebrae (T. 19, 20, 25, 29). The new injury was
about three-fourths of an inch from the location of a prior disc
fusion (T. 30). Mrs. Marshall explained that she had not told
defendant about the prior back surgery because she had gone to
see him only for digestive problems (T. 14).
David Fairhurst is the keeper of the licensing records
for the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for
the Department of Commerce (T. 8-9). His review of the records
established that defendant was not licensed to practice medicine
in the State of Utah (T. 9).
Following the trial, defendant was found guilty of
practicing medicine without a license.

Judge Hanson had urged

defendant on at least two occasions leading up to trial to obtain
an attorney (ST. 9). Nevertheless, defendant opted to represent
himself in the trial.
Sentencing was set for October 10, 1989, but on motion
of defendant, was continued to October 24, 1989 to allow him to
obtain an attorney (R. 50). On the date set for sentencing, the
court heard and denied defendant's motion for new trial (R. 73).
The court then sentenced defendant to up to five years in the
Utah State Prison and imposed a fine of $5,000 (R. 74). The
court stayed execution of the prison sentence and placed
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defendant on eighteen months probation and suspended all but
$3,000 of the fine (R. 74).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A litigant who chooses to represent himself at trial
is, as a general rule, held to the same standard of competence as
a member of the bar.
The evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's
guilt of practicing medicine without a license.
The state was not required to affirmatively prove that
defendant's conduct did not fall within one of the exemptions to
the requirement that one be licensed to practice medicine.
The statute that prohibits the practice of medicine
without a license is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
The trial court did not erroneously admit evidence of
the circumstances surrounding defendant's treatment of Mrs.
Marshall.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant defendant's motion for new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO REPRESENT HIMSELF
AT TRIAL; HAVING MADE THAT DECISION, HE IS TO
BE HELD TO THE SAME STANDARD AS AN ATTORNEY.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence."

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution

provides specifically that an accused has the right to self-
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representation:

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have

the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . ."
It is a basic principle of law that an accused in a
criminal case may defend himself without counsel.

However, since

a pro se defendant relinquishes many of the benefits associated
with counsel, an assertion of this right must be made "knowingly
and intelligently."
(1975).

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835

Defendant was informed by Judge Hanson on at least two

occasions of the hazards involved in self-representation and the
judge "urged" him to obtain an attorney (ST. 9). Defendant chose
to proceed pro se. He now claims that he should not be held to
the same stringent standard as a law-trained attorney.

He claims

that although his objections were inartful, this Court should
consider them as having been made.
In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:

"As a general rule, a party who

represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge
and practice as any qualified member of the bar."
omitted.)

(Citations

The Court noted, however, that "[a]t the same time, we

have also cautioned that 'because of his lack of technical
knowledge of law and procedure, [a layman acting as his own
attorney] should be accorded every consideration that may
reasonably be indulged.'"

JEd.

(Second alteration in original.)

However, "reasonable consideration" for a pro se litigant does
not require the trial court to "interrupt the course of
proceedings to translate legal terms, explain legal rules, or
otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of the
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party's decision to function in a capacity for which he is not
trained."

Ld.

The legal system cannot function on a basis other

than one of equal treatment for all litigants.

See Mangiaracina

v. Gutierrez, 730 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Kan. App. 1986).
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR PRACTICING
MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE.
Defendant was convicted following a bench trial of
practicing medicine without a license, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988).

This

section of the Code, part of the Medical Practice Act, states in
pertinent part:

"It is unlawful to engage in the practice of

medicine in this state without first obtaining a license. Any
person who engages in the practice of medicine without a license
is guilty of a felony . . . ."
1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp.

The practice of medicine is defined in Utah Code Ann.

§ 58-12-28(4) (Supp. 1988) as meaning "to diagnose, treat,
correct, advise, or prescribe for any human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical
or mental, real or imaginary, or attempt to do so by any means or
instrumentality."

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4) (Supp. 1988).

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction.

The standard of review applied to

bench trials when examining the sufficiency of the evidence is a
clearly erroneous standard.

"The trial court's findings, entered

after a bench trial, will not be overturned unless they are
clearly erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the
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evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

State v.

Wessendorf# 777 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).

See also State v.

Fowler, 745 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
As the trial court noted, there are two elements the
State was required to prove to convict defendant of practicing
medicine without a license (T. 55). First, the state was
required to prove that defendant's actions constituted the
practice of medicine as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)
(Supp. 1988).

Second, the state was required to prove that at

the time of the alleged behavior, defendant was not licensed to
practice medicine in the State of Utah.
There is no question as to the second element of the
crime.

David Fairhurst, Licensing Coordinator at the Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing for the Department of
Commerce, is the keeper of records for professional licensing for
the State of Utah (T. 8). His review of the records established
that defendant was not licensed to practice medicine in the State
of Utah (T. 9). His testimony was uncontroverted, and the trial
court properly found that element of the crime to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority of the evidence at trial went to the first
element of the crime.

Mr. and Mrs. Marshall supplied ample

evidence to convict defendant. And, as the trial court noted,
even the testimony of the defense witnesses, Deryl and Bernice
Tischner, did not refute, but was compatible with, the charges
against defendant (T. 61).
-13-

Carol Marshall testified that Deryl Tischner
recommended that she see the defendant regarding her "digestive
problems" (T. 11, 33). Mr. Tischner arranged the "appointment"
with defendant (T. 22, 32). And both Mr. and Mrs. Marshall and
Mr. and Mrs. Tischner testified to various acts of defendant in
his "examining room" or "office." (T. 10-24, 31-48).
Defendant had Mrs., Marshall lie atop his examining
table where he probed her abdomen, sternum and throat with his
hands (T. 14-15, 43-44).

Having done this, defendant diagnosed

Mrs. Marshall as having "a messed up pancreas" (T. 15, 22, 4344).

No testimony was offered denying or rebutting these facts.

Defendant later informed Mrs. Marshall that she had a sinus
infection after pain persisted when he stopped pressing on
pressure points in her mouth (T. 18). Defendant's actions
constituted "examin[ing] in any manner another person . . . to
determine the source, nature, kind, or extent of a disease or
other physical or mental condition, or [an] attempt to so
examine . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(2) (Supp. 1988).

Therefore, defendant "diagnosed" Mrs. Marshall within the meaning
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(2) (Supp. 1988), and thus engaged in
the "practice of medicine" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-1228(4).
Defendant attempts to establish that he did not
diagnose Mrs. Marshall by citing to various sources which state
that diagnosis requires recognition of a disease from symptoms
observed.

He further argues that he would have had to "NAME a

disease" in order to have "diagnosed" Mrs. Marshall (Appellant's
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Opening Brief at 11-12).

However, defendant's reliance on Tabors

Medical Encyclopedia is not helpful since the relevant definition
of "diagnose" is defined by statute.

Defendant cannot deny that

his actions constituted a diagnosis by admitting that he was
unable to name Mrs. Marshall's ailment, especially when § 58-1228(2) precludes "attempts" to diagnosis.

Defendant examined

Carol Marshall and diagnosed her, albeit crudely, as suffering
from "a messed up pancreas," and as having a probable sinus
infection.
Defendant's diagnosis of Mrs. Marshall, in itself, is
sufficient to support his conviction.

But there was ample

evidence that he also engaged in the practice of medicine by
treating and advising Mrs. Marshall, or attempting to treat or
advise her within the meaning of § 58-12-28(4)(a).
After diagnosing Mrs. Marshall's "messed up pancreas,"
defendant shook her esophagus, which he called her "rattling
chain" (T. 15). He positioned her on her side and applied
pressure to each of her hips (T. 16). Mr. Marshall testified
that defendant applied pressure to her sternum (T. 44). Both
Mrs. and Mr. Marshall testified that defendant performed some
kind of manipulation on her neck (T. 15, 45). This caused her
neck to produce popping sounds and resulted in considerable pain
(T. 15, 45). Bernice Tischner, a defense witness, testified that
the defendant performed a "cranial" on Mrs. Marshall, and
referred to his usual practice of taking hold of the head and
pulling on it and turning it from side to side (T. 37, 40).
These acts, alone, are sufficient to constitute the practice of
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medicine.

Acts of adjustment to various parts of the body,

particularly to the spine, constitute chiropractic, which
requires licensure.

Shober v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah

399, 68 P.2d 757 (1937); State v. Erickson, 47 Utah 452, 154 P.
948 (Utah 1916).
Mr. and Mrs. Marshall, and Mrs. Tischner testified that
defendant performed some type of accupressure on Mrs. Marshall to
relieve either a headache or the pain from her twisted neck (T.
37, 45, 17). The

trial court found that the few times that

these facts were disputed, Mr. and Mrs. Marshall's testimony
appeared most credible to him (T. 61). However unorthodox his
methods were, defendant's actions constituted "treatment" within
the meaning of the statute.
Not only did defendant treat Mrs. Marshall, he also
"advised" her.

He suggested that she alter her diet and avoid

certain types of foods (T. 18). Defendant prescribed a "green
drink" consisting of vegetables, pineapple juice, and cayenne
pepper (T. 18). Finally, he recommended that she use garlic
enemas (T. 23). None of these facts were controverted at trial.
Defendant's acts constitute "advising" within the meaning of the
statute.
Further, defendant maintained an office, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(b) for the purpose of engaging in
the practice of medicine.
As the trial court correctly concluded, the only
exception contained in subsections (1) through (11) of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-12-30 that might even possibly apply to defendant is

-16-

subsection (5). This subsection provides an exception to the
licensure requirement to an "individual administering a domestic
or family remedy including those persons engaged in the sale of
vitamins, health food or health food supplements, herb or other
products of nature, except drugs or medicines for which an
authorized prescription is required by law . . . ."
Ann. § 58-12-30(5) (Supp. 1988).

Utah Code

Defendant claims in his third

point that the Medical Practice Act does not apply to persons who
practice the "healing arts."

As set forth above, defendant's

acts went far beyond the acts allowed by the exception in
subsection (5), and therefore this argument is without merit.
Defendant's conviction is supported by abundant
evidence.

He diagnosed, treated, and advised Mrs. Marshall

within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(2) and (4). Thus
he engaged in the practice of medicine, for which he did not have
a license.

The evidence placed defendant squarely within the

prohibition of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30. The trial court
extensively detailed the facts upon which it based its verdict
(T. 62-66).

Defendant's assertion of insufficiency of evidence

is unfounded, and his conviction should therefore be affirmed.
POINT III
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO AFFIRMATIVELY
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT DID NOT FALL
WITHIN EACH OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
LICENSURE REQUIREMENT. REGARDLESS, THE
EXCEPTIONS DO NOT APPLY.
Defendant argues that his conviction under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-12-30 (Supp. 1988) was erroneous because the state
failed to affirmatively prove that he did not fall within any of
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the exceptions listed in the statute.

Specifically, defendant

claims that the state was required to prove that he was not
exempt from prosecution under §§ 58-12-30(4), (5) and (6).
Defendant also argues that he was, in fact, exempt under these
subsections of the statute, which exempt the following persons:
(4) any individual rendering aid in an
emergency, when no fee or other consideration
of value for the service is contemplated,
charged or received;
(5) any individual administering a domestic
or family remedy including those persons
engaged in the sale of vitamins, health food
or health food supplements, herb or other
products of nature, except drugs or medicines
for which an authorized prescription is
required by law;
(6) a person engaged in good faith in the
practice of the religious tenets of any
church or religious belief without the use of
any drugs or medicines for which an
authorized prescription is required by law.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-12-30(4), (5) & (6) (Supp. 1988).
These subsections were enacted by the legislature as
affirmative defenses to the crime enumerated in the statute. An
affirmative defense is one that does not deny the acts charged,
but seeks instead to justify or excuse the actor despite his
behavior.

See United States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 466 (5th Cir.

1975).
Defendant's argument is based on the mistaken premise
that the state carries the burden of disproving all potential
affirmative defenses in a criminal prosecution.

The United

States Supreme Court has determined that due process requires the
state to prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which [the defendant] is charged."
364 (1970).

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

But n[p]roof of the nonexistence of an affirmative
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defense is not constitutionally required."

See State v. Cox, 751

P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)).
Defendant offers no authority in support of his
assertion that the state was required to disprove the exemptions
provided in the statute.

Further, defendant did not argue that

he qualified for exemption at trial; he is, therefore, precluded
from raising the argument on appeal.
P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985).

State v. Chancellor, 704

Even if these claims had been

properly preserved for appeal, they are not supported by the
evidence.
Defendant claims that he qualified for exemption under
§ 58-12-30(4) because he was "rendering aid in an emergency" and
was not paid for his services.

Defendant points to the fact that

he interrupted his vacation at Snowbird for "the express purpose
of meeting with the complainant" (Appellant's Opening Brief at
14).

He contends that this is evidence of an emergency.

However, Deryl Tischner, a defense witness, testified that the
defendant interrupted his vacation because Mr. and Mrs. Marshall
could not otherwise make arrangements to visit defendant, so he
accommodated them by returning from Snowbird.

(T. 32). The

record does not support defendant's claim that he was "rendering
aid in an emergency."
Defendant also claims that he qualified for exemption
under § 58-12-30(5) which excuses individuals administering
"domestic or family remedies."

Defendant relies on State v. Yee

Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488, 491 (1915), for a definition of
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"domestic medicines:"
Such substances as are commonly kept by
nonprofessional persons in their own homes
for use as remedies in the absence of a
physician, being necessarily substances the
effect of which is a matter of general
knowledge, so that no special training is
required for their safe administration.
(Citations omitted.)
This definition does not assist defendant.

Nothing in

the record or in common experience suggests that "the effect" of
defendant's "garlic enema," or "green drink," is a matter of
general knowledge.

As the court in Yee Foo Lun observed

regarding a mixture of ginseng, licorice, cinnamon and
sasparilla:

"Such a compound or concoction is not something

commonly kept by nonprofessional persons in their homes, or of
which they have general knowledge."

:id. at 491.

"That such a

mixture is free from alcohol, chloroform, narcotic or alkaloidal
drugs, and probably harmless, is not the controlling factor."
Id.

Neither the defendant's green drink nor garlic enema was a

"domestic or family remedy" within the meaning of the statute.
Regardless, defendant's acts went far beyond the
prescription of the green drink and garlic enema.

As set forth

above, defendant engaged in acts of abdominal examination and
spinal manipulation and made conclusions about Mrs. Marshall's
pancreas and infected sinuses.

Thus, subsection (5) does not

except him from criminal responsibility.
Defendant also claims that he qualified for exemption
from prosecution by § 58-12-30(6), which excuses persons engaged
in good faith in the practice of any religious tenet.
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There is

no evidence in the record concerning defendant's religious
beliefs or a religious basis for his actions.

Defendant's

attempts to supplement the record with references to his
religious status cannot be countenanced by this Court.

Because

the record does not support his claims, they should be
disregarded.

Utah R. App. P. 24(7); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.,

746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The state was not required to affirmatively disprove
the potential exemptions contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1230(4), (5) & (6). See State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Reams v. State, 279 So. 2d 839, 843 (Fla. 1973)
(under Florida Medical Practice Act, defendant must raise and
prove exemptions under the Act).

Even so, the trial judge

indicated that he had considered the possible exemptions and
found them inapplicable (T. 64-66).

Nothing in the record

suggests that defendant would have qualified for any of the
exemptions provided by the statute.

Defendant's conviction

should therefore be affirmed.
POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-30, WHICH PROHIBITS
PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE, IS
NEITHER UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD NOR
VAGUE.
Defendant asserts that it is understandable that he
would be asked to share his gifts with those who are suffering
and that his acts do not constitute practicing medicine.

In the

alternative, without legal support, he asserts that if his acts
do constitute practicing medicine, the statute is overly broad
and vague.
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Defendant has not cited to any legal authority to
support his argument that the statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad or unclear.

For this reason, his argument should not

be considered by this Court,

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)•

Regardless, the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30
(Supp. 1988), withstands constitutional scrutiny.

Defendant's

argument appears to be that the language in the statute is overly
broad because it may prohibit acts that are constitutionally
permissible.

He points to various acts he claims to have engaged

in and asserts they do not constitute practicing medicine.
"Legislative enactments are accorded a presumption of
validity.

In considering a challenge to the overbreadth of a

law, the law must be shown to reach a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct.
challenge will fail."
1987).

If it does not, the

State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah

In Hoffman, the defendant was convicted of practicing

medicine without a license for having attempted to diagnose and
treat stomach pains as "chemical poisoning, stomach ulcers, and
'negative energies.'"

Id. at 504. He prescribed pain killer

pills, celestial water, and special pillows as treatments for the
maladies.

Ici. He claimed on appeal that the provision of the

Code which defines the practice of medicine was fatally vague and
overbroad.
As in the present case, Hoffman failed to distinguish
the concept of vagueness from the concept of overbreadth and only
argued the latter.

The Court held that defendant's conduct in

purporting to diagnose maladies and prescribe treatments like
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"celestial water" was not constitutionally protected conduct; he
was not engaging in a constitutionally protected activity.
at 505.

Id.

Because his conduct was prohibited by the statute, he

could "not be heard to complain that the statute is overbroad so
as to prohibit conduct that is not applicable to the facts of his
case.

Having engaged in conduct not constitutionally protected,

defendant is not entitled to assert a constitutional claim that
might be argued by someone else who prescribes domestic or family
remedies."

Ld. at 505-06, citing People v. Jeffers, 690 P.2d

194, 194 (Colo. 1984); State v. Baker, 229 N.C. 73, 48 S.E.2d 61,
67 (1948).
The facts of the present case are remarkably similar to
the facts in Hoffman.

As in Hoffman, defendant's conduct is not

constitutionally protected.

He, therefore, is not entitled to

assert a claim in this case that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE TREATMENT PROVIDED BY DEFENDANT.
Defendant claims that, because causing pain is not an
element of the charge, the trial court erred in admitting
evidence concerning Mrs. Marshall's pain and subsequent
operation.

He also claims that Mr. Fairhurst, the keeper of the

records at Occupational and Professional Licensing, was not
qualified to testify that he was not licensed to practice
medicine.

This aspect of the argument can be summarily disposed

of; Mr. Fairhurst was qualified as the keeper of the records,
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reviewed the records, and found that defendant was not licensed
to practice medicine (T. 8-9)•
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that all
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
constitutional provision, statute or rule.

Mrs. Marshall

testified that she experienced pain after being treated by
defendant (T. 19). Paul Jacobsen, a physical therapist,
testified that Mrs. Marshall came to see him, complaining of
pain, after having had her neck "twisted by a doctor in Salt
Lake" (T. 26). He did not treat her, but rather referred her to
two physicians, one of whom was Dr. Gaufin (T. 26). Dr. Gaufin
testified that he performed surgery on Mrs. Marshall for a
herniated cervical disc between the fifth and sixth vertebrae (T.
29).

The injury was in close proximity to a prior surgical

fusion (T. 30). Defendant objected to the statement made by Mrs.
Marshall to Paul Jacobsen based upon grounds of hearsay, but did
not otherwise object to the testimony.
hearsay objection.

The court sustained the

Because defendant did not object to the

testimony of either Jacobsen or Gaufin on grounds that it was
inflammatory, his argument cannot be heard on appeal.

State v.

Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985).
There is no question that causing pain is not an
element of the offense.

However, the testimony was relevant,

albeit not essential, to corroborate Mrs. Marshall's testimony.
The trial court has considerable discretion in deciding whether
evidence is relevant.
1986).

Bambrouqh v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah

The trial court should not be reversed absent a showing
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by a defendant that the court abused its discretion.

Terry v.

Zions Corp. Mercantile Inst.# 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled
on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs, Co., Inc.# 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984).

Because in a bench trial a judge is less likely to

be influenced by inflammatory evidence than might be the case in
a jury trial, the trial court is given even more discretion in
this area.

See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989).

Defendant has not established that the court abused its
discretion.
POINT VI
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HIS
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a new trial because he was
untrained in the law and, therefore, he was "railroaded" in this
case (Appellant's Opening Brief at 26).

He also claims as a

basis for his motion that, had the trial court granted his
request, the state would have been spared the expense of
prosecuting this appeal.

Id.

Defendant cites no legal authority

in support of his argument, but rather indicates that the court
abused its discretion.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
that the court may "grant a new trial in the interest of justice
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party."

Whether to grant a

motion for new trial is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears
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that the trial court abused its discretion and that the defendant
was prejudiced.

State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. App.

1989).
Defendant voluntarily chose to represent himself at
trial.

Having knowingly made the decision, despite the urging of

the court to obtain counsel, he cannnot now be heard to complain
on this basis.
appeal.

He has chosen to represent himself in this

If he does not prevail, he could again claim that he has

been "railroaded" and is entitled to further relief.

Defendant

has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Defendant was properly convicted of practicing medicine
without a license.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as any

additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of Utah
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
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